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(Part 2 of 7)
INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
“The most prolific rhetoric of fundamentalism … is
reserved for Islam, and especially for the
depiction of contemporary events in the Middle
East.”[9]
It should be noted up front that many Muslims
reject usage of the Western terms “fundamentalism”
and “fundamentalist,” instead preferring the terms
“Islamism” and “Islamists” when speaking of groups
advocating Islamic political law. Both the
Western roots of “fundamentalist” terminology and
the extremist perception associated with the term
are reason to resist usage of the term.[10]
Nonetheless, “fundamentalism” is now a
commonly-used term in describing the
ultra-conservative expressions of Islamic,
Christian, and Jewish faith groups, among
others. This terminology is useful in that
it recognizes, as noted previously, that
similarities do exist among ultra-conservative
expressions of various faith groups. In
addition, the term is employed across faith groups
by a growing number of religious scholars
worldwide, scholars who note the differences among
faith groups while also recognizing that
opposition to modernity is an instrumental, shared
element of certain ultra-conservative expressions
within a variety of faith groups.[11]
Accordingly, for the purposes of this paper,
“fundamentalist” terminology will be employed,
although with the understanding that it is, in
some respects, a contested terminology.
Although Islamic fundamentalism is indeed a modern
phenomenon, it cannot be properly understood apart
from the larger context of Islamic faith and
Muslim history. Ultimately, Islamic
fundamentalism is religious in nature, and in
approaching the subject one must examine “the
dynamics of the expansion of Islam as a world
religion of salvation.”[12]
Fundamentalist Islamic ideology is based upon two
“pillars”: the conviction that Islamic law
(the sharia) is the only valid system for
regulating human life (individual, social and
political), and the conviction that a true and
faithful Muslim society can only be achieved
through an Islamic state.[13]
The Prophet Muhammad is the founder and central
figure of the Islamic faith. In 610 C. E.
Muhammad received his first revelation from
God. Over time, the Prophet received a
number of revelations which were transcribed into
the text of the Quran. Received and recorded
as God’s direct revelation (or Word), the Quran
became the written text of Islam and the
authoritative source of law. Over the course
of ensuing generations, statements and actions
attributed to Muhammad and transmitted orally by
his followers were compiled and written down into
the accepted hadith (many sayings and
actions attributed to Muhammad were
disputed). The hadith revealed the sunna
(or path) that Muslims should follow in the daily
living of their lives. Taken together with
the Quran and the consensus of learned scholars
within the Muslim community, they eventually
formed the sharia, Islam’s sacred law.
Muhammad developed a small following in his
hometown of Mecca, but his new religious views
eventually put him at odds with city
leaders. Forced to flee, Muhammad and his
followers settled in the nearby city of Medina in
622. He soon rose to political and military
prominence, negotiating a treaty with Mecca in
628, then breaking the treaty and capturing Mecca
in 630. For the next two years, Muhammad
expanded his power throughout the region of
Arabia.[14]
After
Muhammad’s death in 632 C.E., his followers were
left with the task of trying to determine who
should succeed the Prophet (Muhammad had left no
instructions in terms of successors).
Initially, the struggle was of a political
nature. Abu Bakr, an early convert to Islam
and trusted advisor and close friend of Muhammad,
was selected as the first caliph (successor to
Muhammad). His selection was controversial
and came at a time when the Muslim state was
expanding into southern Syria and Iraq.
Tribes throughout Arabia openly revolted against
Abu Bakr, while proclaiming loyalty to
Muhammad. Near death, Abu Bakr appointed
Umar b. al-Khattab as his successor. Umar
successfully expanded the Muslim empire, quickly
conquering Iraq, Iran, Syria, Palestine, Armenia
and Egypt. The conquered peoples were given
the status of dhimi (“protected peoples”)
and were treated well. Umar utilized local
administrators under the rule of Muslim
governors.
Umar’s
assassination in 644 led to the appointment of
Uthman b. Affan as the third caliph. Uthman
continued Umar’s expansionist policies in the
midst of growing opposition, at the same time
hiring many of his own kin as administrators, to
the point of straining the treasury. In
addition, he took religious authority upon
himself, burning all copies of the Quran other
than the one version he deemed the official
version. Uthman was also assassinated, and
civil war broke out under his successor Ali b. Abi
Talib. Ali, who had been part of the
opposition to Uthman, refused to punish Uthman’s
murderers, in the process alienating supporters of
the first three caliphs. In the meantime,
Syria appointed a rival caliph, Muawiya, who went
to war against Ali and became caliph of the entire
empire following Ali’s murder, thus ending the
original reign of caliphs (all four of whom had
been related to Muhammad in some manner) and
beginning the reign of the Umayyad dynasty.
Supporters of Ali were Shiite Muslims, who devoted
themselves to preserving the house of Ali and
seeking to amend the wrong done to him. To
the Shiite, the first three caliphs were not
legitimate, and the caliphate ended with Ali, as
testified by both the end of Muhammad’s lineage
and the evil acts which took place among the
Umayyad dynasty.
On
the other hand, Sunni Muslims embraced all four
caliphs as orthodox, viewing their collective
reign as the golden age of Islam, while also
recognizing that all the descendants of the
Arabian Quraysh tribe (which included the Umayyad
clan), despite being marked by some periods of
evil, were nonetheless legitimate caliphs.[15]
Shortly after Ali’s death, as Arab Muslims sought
political organization following decades of
expansion, two rebellious movements, the
puritanical (Sunni) Kharijism and millenarian
Shi’ism, arose advocating Islam as a universal
religion of salvation. The Shi’ite
millenarian rebellion of the 680s proclaimed a
coming messiah (the Mahdi), a belief
later incorporated into popular Sufism.
Kharijism, on the other hand, rejected the
present world by separating itself and advocating
a rigid application of Islamic law as espoused in
the Quran, proclaiming that nominal Muslims were
infidels.[16]
The tension between Sunnis and Shiites has
remained to the present time. Although the
Shiites showed the earliest orthodox tendencies,
the vast majority of Muslims today are Sunni, and
fundamentalism is more common among Sunnis than
Shiites.[17]
By the end of the ninth century, Islamic law was
in the process of expanding to include not only
the Quran, but also the hadith.
Together, the Quran and the accepted hadith
came to comprise the authoritative Scripture for
the faith community. The establishment of
the Sunni Hanbali school of law in the same
century, a reaction against rational theology,
provided the medieval archetype of later Islamic
revivalism. The Hanbalites held to the Quran
as the literal, unquestioned, and uncreated Word
of God, while affirming the Tradition (or customs)
of Muhammad (Sunna, and hence Sunni)
and the consensus of the Muslim community (jama’a).[18]
The Hanbalite tradition, in turn, produced the
strict Wahhabi tradition in Arabia in the late
eighteenth century. The founder of the
Wahhabi tradition was Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab,
a religious scholar who formed an alliance with
Muhammad bin Saud, the first ruler of what would
become Saudia Arabia, and who traveled throughout
the Muslim world and journeyed to Medina and
Mecca. Distraught by the compromises the
Islamic faith had made with popular religious
practices (as expressed in the mystical faith of
Sufism), Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, seeking to revive the
Islamic faith, taught the transcendent unity of
God (tawhid) and strict obedience to the
Quran.[19]
The
Wahhabis, believing that modern Islam had become
corrupted and polluted from within, were a
revivalist movement which sought to return Islam
to its pure roots. In 1766, Wahhab’s
doctrinal views won recognition among the scholars
of Mecca. The Wahhabi movement became very
influential, leading to the founding of other
similar movements. Properly speaking, the
Wahhabi movement was a revivalist movement based
on orthodox Islamic law.[20]
Ironically, the Wahhabis ideological opposites
(the more liberal Sufi expression of the Islamic
faith, based on popular spirituality) provided the
organizational model for Islamic revivalism.[21]
The Wahhabi movement was one of a number of
Islamic revival and reform movements in the
eighteenth century.[22]
In the twentieth century, Wahhabi Islam would
provide the theological foundation for a political
fundamentalist state.[23]
The 1857 Sepoy uprising in India, in which both
Muslims and Hindus revolted against British rule,
provided the impetus for the next ideological
stepping stone in the history of Islamic
fundamentalism. The British reacted to
the uprising by persecuting Muslims. In an attempt
to prevent suspected Muslim disloyalty from
getting out of hand, the British destroyed Muslim
holy sites in Delhi. The persecution, in
turn, led Muslim ulama (theologians) to
found private madrasas (colleges) over
which the British state would have no
control. The first such school was located
in the town of Deobandi, about 90 miles northeast
of Delhi. The Deobandi schools taught adherence to
strict interpretations of Islamic law, based on
the Quran and the hadith.
Intellectually, via publications and debates, the
Deobandi scholars sought to establish Islam as the
one true faith. Socially, the Deobandi
school of thought rejected the shrine elements of
Islamic mysticism (Sufism) which had developed in
the ninth century as Islam sought to accommodate
the faiths of conquered lands. In the place
of mysticism, the Deobandis taught careful
personal adherence to morality and piety as
spelled out in the Quran and hadith.
The Deobandi tradition thus served to provide a
highly intellectual, socially structured, and
overtly evangelical scriptural foundation for an
Islamic faith which was facing growing pressure
from Western influences.[24]
The shift from revivalism to fundamentalism
initially took place through the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood (“The Society of Muslim Brothers”)
movement in the 1930s. Although originally
based in Egypt, the movement has exercised
formidable influence throughout the Arab
world. The Muslim Brotherhood, as R. Hrair
Dekmejian notes, “more than any other
organization, has been the ideological and
institutional epicenter of fundamentalism in the
Arab sphere and the Islamic world … it is
impossible to comprehend contemporary Sunni
Islamism and its Arab manifestations without a
firm understanding of the origins and evolution of
the brotherhood.”[25]
Founded in 1929 by Hasan al-Banna, the Muslim
Brotherhood tapped into popular unrest against
British rule, local political turmoil, and the
corrupting influence of the West. Banna, a
Sufi spiritualist, Islamic scholar, and activist
leader, was the “avatar” of modern Sunni
revivalism. His movement, which was more
successful than previous revivalist movements,
possessed an activist ideology, an organizational
structure, charismatic leadership, mass following
and a pragmatic orientation. The movement
was based on the Quran and the hadith,
and translated doctrine into social action at a
time when Egypt was in social unrest.[26]
Initially espousing non-violence, the Brotherhood
quickly became one of Egypt’s most powerful
organizations. The group was effectively
organized, made extensive use of propaganda, and
appealed to a cross-section of Egyptian
society. However, Banna’s efforts to use
politics to enact Islamic law in Egypt led to
state persecution of the group by the late 1940s,
which in turn led to the assassination of the
Egyptian monarch by a Muslim Brother, for which
Banna was assassinated in reprisal.
The
following decades witnessed escalating clashes
between the increasingly violent Brotherhood (as
well as the many new fundamentalist groups it
spawned) and Islamic secular states.
Israel’s victory in the 1967 war was a crucial
event. Islamic fundamentalists proclaimed
that the Arab world lost the war because of a lack
of religious faith, and fundamentalist calls for
the imposition of shariah (Islamic) law
found even greater reception in the Arab
world. Anwar al-Sadat, who ascended to the
Egyptian presidency in 1970, sought to co-opt the
rising fundamentalist tide through the 1971
establishment of Islam as the official religion of
the Egyptian state, and sharia law as a
source of legislation (in 1980, sharia
law was made the main source of
legislation). Nonetheless, Sadat’s openness
to the West and Israel, as evidenced by the 1979
Camp David Accord with United States President
Carter Israeli Prime Minister Begin, resulting in
peace with Israel, was scorned by the multiplying
Islamic fundamentalist organizations. In
September 1981, realizing that he had
underestimated Islamic fundamentalists, Sadat led
the government in taking direct control of all
mosques and arresting thousands of
militants. One month later he was dead,
assassinated by members of the Islamic
fundamentalist group Tanzim al-Jihad. Since
Sadat’s assassination, a variety of Islamic
fundamentalist movements in Egypt have
increasingly turned to violence against the state,
unacceptable social conduct, and even one another.[27]
A parallel transition from scriptural
fundamentalism to political fundamentalism took
place in South Asia via the Jama’at-i Islami
(Islamic Party), founded by the Deobandi-trained
Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi (1903-1979) in
1941. Concerned with the decline of Muslim
power in India in the early twentieth century,
Mawdudi determined that diversity, in the form of
interfaith mixing and a growing liberalization of
Muslim faith, had weakened Islam. The answer
was to sever social and political ties with Hindus
and other non-Muslims and take up arms against
non-Muslims.
Mawdudi looked to the Quran for a scriptural
rationale for his militant views:
“Fight
in the cause of God those who fight you, but do
not transgress limits; for God loveth not
transgressors. And slay them wherever ye
catch them, and turn them out from where they have
turned you out; for tumult and oppression are
worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the
sacred mosque, unless they (first) fight you
there; but if they fight you, slay them.
Such is the reward of those who suppress
faith. But if they cease, God is
Oft-forgiving, most Merciful. And fight them
on until there is no more tumult or oppression,
and there prevail justice and faith in God; but if
they cease, let there be no hostility except to
those who practice oppression.” (s.
2:190-193)
Mawdudi also found parallel
justification in the hadith.
The
Jama’at-i Islami was thus formed as a political
movement to transform society via strict Islamic
ideology, considering itself as the “vanguard” of
an Islamic revolution. Yet within two
decades of its founding, the party became more
pragmatic in approach, advocating a constitution
for Pakistan that included a commitment to
democracy and individual rights. However,
faced with Communist encroachments in Pakistan in
the late 1960s, the Jama’at-i Islami eventually
abandoned cooperative efforts and sought to
establish a strict Islamic state identity in
opposition to the Bhutto regime. Ultimately
failing in this regard, and losing significant
grassroots political support in the process, the
party fell back to trying to accommodate both
ideology and pragmatism. The rebirth of
democracy in Pakistan in 1988 has since forced the
Jama’at-i Islami to recognize the importance of
further compromise if the party is to have a
meaningful voice in the political structure of
Pakistan.[28]
In short, by the 1980s the legacy of Islamic
revivalism, as expressed in Wahabbi Islam and the
Deobandi madrasa tradition, had found firm
fruition in a milieu of political fundamentalist
organizations which were actively seeking to
impose sharia law in states throughout the
Arab world and beyond, a subject which will
command our later attention.
The proliferation of Islamic political
fundamentalism, in turn, has been characterized by
certain behavioral characteristics, ranging from
passive to militant. The following
characteristics are indicative of modern Islamic
fundamentalism:
Characteristics of
Individualistic Passive Fundamentalism
1. Regular mosque attendance (five
times a day).
2. Strict Observance of the Five
Pillars of Islam:
a. Profession of faith (shahadah)
b. Prayers (salat)
c. Fasting (sawm)
d. Almsgiving (sakat)
e. Pilgrimage (hajj)
3. Strict adherence to Quranic
prohibitions (such as abstaining from alcohol and
sexual immorality)
4. Regular religious meditation,
reading of the Quran, and reading of other
Islamic literature.
5. Participation in religious group
activities within and without the mosque.
6. Participation in neighborhood
self-help and mutual assistance societies
7. Growing full beards (lihya) and
thin moustaches as a sign of devotion and
piety.
8. Wearing distinctive clothing
(including a facial and head veil for women)
Characteristics of
Individualistic Activist Fundamentalism
1. Pursuit of passive characteristics
listed above with great rigor.
2. Tendency to live together in
specific neighborhoods, sometimes in physical
and social isolation from passive fundamentalists.
3. Frequenting of specific mosques
that cater to activist agendas.
4. Engagement in acts of “purifying”
violence directed against sinful institutions,
including nightclubs, movie theatres, and
governments.
Manifestations of
Collective Islamic Fundamentalism
1. Mosque building (both private and
government sponsored).
2. Radio-television programming
(provides religious instruction).
3. Observance of holidays (observed
with great religious fervor).
4. Mosque attendance (faithful
devotion).
5. The press (increase in religious
instruction in newspapers).
6. Illumination of mosques (elaborate
lighting at nighttime).
7. Religious literature (an
unprecedented increase in printing copies of the
Quran
and books on Islamic history and religion.
8. Displays of copies of the Quran (in
public places).
9. Religious slogans (increasingly
displayed in public places).[29]
Finally, terrorist activity against Western
government and society has become a vivid
expression of Islamic political fundamentalism in
recent years.[30]
[9]
Bassam Tibi, “The Worldview of Sunni Arab
Fundamentalists: Attitudes toward Modern
Science and Technology,” in
Fundamentalisms and Society, The
Fundamentalism Project, Volume 2, eds. Martin
Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1993),
73.
[10]
Gabriel Ben-Dor, “The Uniqueness of Islamic
Fundamentalism,” in Religious Radicalism
in the Greater Middle East, eds. Bruce
Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar (London and
Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1997), 241.
[11]
In recent decades, scholarly literature on
religious fundamentalisms has
mushroomed. Although the purpose of this
paper is neither to survey nor list such
literature, the massive The Fundamentalism
Project, referenced throughout this
essay, is indicative of the understanding by
scholars of the appropriateness of
fundamentalist terminology.
[13]
Guazzone, Laura, ed., The Islamist
Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist
Movements in the Contemporary Arab World
(Berkshire, UK: Ithaca Press, 1995), 10.
[14]
Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History
(New York: Random House Modern Library,
2002). Daniel Pipes, In the Path of
God: Islam and Political Power (New
York: Basic Books Inc., 1983), 36-37, 72-74.
[15]
Armstrong, Islam. Emmanuel Sivan
and Menachem Friedman, eds., Religious
Radicalism in the Middle East (Albany,
New York: State University of New York, 1990),
39-47. P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton and
Bernard Lewis, The Cambridge History of
Islam (United Kingdom: Cambridge
University Press, 1970). Fred M. Donner, The
Early Islamic Conquests (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1981).
[16]
Arjomand, 179. Dilip Hiro, Holy
Wars: The Rise of Islamic Fundamentalism
(New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall,
Inc., 1989), 2-25.
[17]
John O. Voll, “Fundamentalism in the Sunni
Arab World,” in Fundamentalisms Observed,
The Fundamentalism Project, Volume 1, eds.
Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1991),
345-402.
[22]
John O. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change
in the Modern World (Syracuse, New York:
Syracuse University Press, 1994), 24-83.
[23]
R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islamic Revolution:
Fundamentalism in the Arab World
(Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University
Press, 1995), 130-151.
[24]
Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Revival in
British India: 1860-1900 (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982),
87-260. Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R.
Metcalf, A Concise History of India
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
99-114.
[27]
Ibid., 77-84. Hiro, 60-107. Gehad
Auda, “The ‘Normalization’ of the Islamic
Movement in Egypt from the 1970s to the Early
1980s,” in Accounting for Fundamentalisms,
The Fundamentalism Project, Volume 4, eds.
Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1994),
374-412.
[28]
Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the
Islamic Revolution: The Jama’at i-Islami of
Pakistan (Berkeley and Los Angeles,
California: University of California Press,
1994) and Mawdudi and the Making of
Islamic Revivalism (New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996). T. N.
Madan, “From Orthodoxy to Fundamentalism: A
Thousand Years of Islam in South Asia,” in
Fundamentalisms Comprehended, The
Fundamentalism Project, Volume 5, eds. Martin
Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press, 1995),
288-320.
[30]
Harvey W. Kushner, Encyclopedia of
Terrorism (Thousand Oaks, California:
Sage Publications, 2003).
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