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(Part 3 of 7)
ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM: SOME MAJOR EXPRESSIONS
As has been noted, Islamic political
fundamentalist movements are a twentieth-century
development. Not surprisingly, the majority
of these movements are of the Sunni variety.
Of the 175 Islamic fundamentalist groups (mainly
of the political variety) in the Arab world as
identified by Dekmejian from 1970-1995, only 32
were Shiite fundamentalists (with an additional
four having both Sunni and Shiite followers).[31]
Tracing the history of all the various Islamic
fundamentalist groups is beyond the purview of
this paper. Accordingly, an analysis of a
few countries will serve as evidence of the varied
manner in which Islamic political fundamentalism
has clashed with secular Muslim governments,
resulting in mounting tensions, but varying
successes, in terms of political
involvement.
The ongoing legacy of The Muslim Brotherhood is
evidenced in Egypt’s central role in Sunni
fundamentalism: 40 of the 175 identified
Islamic fundamentalist groups are based in
Egypt. Of those 40, three are major
fundamentalist groups: Hizb al-Tahrir
al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party), Jama’at
al-Muslimin (The Society of Muslims; also known as
al-Takfir wal-Hijrah) and Tanzim al-Jihad (Jihad
Organization). One figure, Sayyid Qutb, is
the dominant link between the Brotherhood and all
three of these Egyptian-based militant
groups. In addition, Qutb links the
Brotherhood and Pakistan’s Jama’at-i Islami (the
two earliest expressions of Islamic political
fundamentalism) and is the key to understanding
modern expressions of Sunni fundamentalism which
originated after his death.
Qutb, an Egyptian government official who was
offended by the racism and the openness between
sexes he witnessed during a visit to the United
States in the late 1940s, became an ideologue and
activist, influenced by the radical teachings of
Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi, founder of the Jama’at
i-Islami. Joining the Muslim Brotherhood in
1952, Qutb led the Brotherhood’s shift from
non-violence to violence. His influence led
to the attempted assassination of Nasser in 1954,
which in turn led to government suppression of the
Brotherhood, including the internment of Qutb and
other radical Brotherhood members.
Influencing the Brotherhood movement from jail,
Qutb garnered support from the military wing of
the Brotherhood within and outside of Egypt, while
continuing his opposition to Nasser’s regime.
By the 1960s, Qutb had formulated a structured,
albeit not fully developed, ideology of modern
society as evil and ignorant of Islam’s divine
guidance. The duty of true Muslims was
to purify the world by the internal transformation
of Islamic society and militant jihad against the
non-Islamic world. He published his views in
Milestones in 1964. Qutb, echoing
Mawdudi, called for a “vanguard” of dedicated
Muslims to emulate the Prophet in separating
themselves from society in order to achieve the
ultimate goal of establishing God’s sovereignty
throughout the earth. The book, along with
Qutb’s martyrdom in 1966, spurred Islamic
fundamentalists to rapid growth and splintering in
the 1970s.[32]
The three main Egyptian Islamic fundamentalist
groups are all influenced by Qutb and draw support
from the midde and lower-middle class (bazaar
merchants, clerics, teaches, professionals and
burecrats), yet each is distinctive enough to
prevent a unified front. Hizb al-Tahrir
al-Islami (or ILP) has focused its attacks
primarily on government structures, while
al-Takfir has charged that all who are not part of
the group are unbelievers. Both outsiders,
the ILP initially sought to quickly capture
political control of Egypt, whereas al-Takfir
pursued a long-term policy of political
takeover. Both groups were suppressed by the
Egyptian government in the late 1970s, although
they have not been driven out of existence.
Al-Jihad, in contrast, quietly infiltrated
military, security services and other governmental
institutions. Their power was revealed in
the assassination of Anwar Sadat in October,
1981. The group’s leaders cited the
disparity between Egypt’s laws and Islamic Law,
Sadat’s peace with Israel, and government
persecution against Islamists in September 1981
(part of an effort to counter the growing
fundamentalist presence in Egypt) as the rationale
for killing Sadat. In the months that
followed, the government arrested thousands of
Islamic fundamentalists, thus curtailing the
group’s effectiveness. Today, the Egyptian
government continues to suppress militant
fundamentalism through government force.[33]
In Syria, the Brotherhood’s influence is also
drawn from the urban middle to lower-middle
classes, comprised of educated small businessmen,
professionals and clerics, the segment of the
population which has benefited the least from the
military and rural oriented Ba’thi party. In
addition, the Brotherhood has produced a number of
splinter groups. Syrian Islamic
fundamentalists became more militant in the 1970s,
turning to armed jihad by 1976.
Numerous attacks on the government structure took
place in ensuing years, leading to government
efforts to suppress the fundamentalist
groups. The Syrian government crushed an
uprising of fundamentalists in Hama in 1983,
leading to a period of decline for
fundamentalists, who were unable to win the Sunni
population to their cause. Despite ongoing
repression, fundamentalism remains an ongoing
threat in Syria.[34]
Algeria has also witnessed the growth of a strong
fundamentalist presence. A combination of
agricultural crisis, unemployment, rampant
inflation, shortages in housing and basic goods,
declining revenues from the oil and gas industry,
and growing foreign debt led to social unrest and
class cleavage. Militant fundamentalist
demonstrations resulted, and despite the
governments attempt to crack down on
fundamentalist groups, mass rioting, led by
fundamentalists, took place in 1988. After a
bloody government reprisal against the rioters,
the Algerian president began a process of
democratization. The fundamentalist Islamic
Salvation Front then won major electoral victories
in 1990 and 1991, only to have the election
results cancelled by the military, and thousands
of fundamentalists sent to prison. In the
aftermath, the movement went underground.
Islamic fundamentalism continues to exist in a
variety of sometimes competing movements, and has
been responsible, along with the Algerian
government, for a period of violent civil war in
the past decade.[35]
Turkey provides an example of the influence of
Islamic fundamentalism in an avowed secular
state. From the 1950s through the 1970s,
Turkey was a multi-party state, experiencing
military coups in 1960 and 1970.
Long-standing political unrest and instability led
to a political coup in 1980, with the military
regime giving way to a democratic, parliamentary
government in 1982. In the ensuing years,
the military has remained a powerful force within
the parliamentarian structure, as Turkey has
continued a program of modernization and remains
on friendly terms with the West. Although
the democratic political structure and relative
freedom within Turkish society has allowed Islamic
fundamentalism to flourish, the government and
military have kept fundamentalist groups in
political check. The main fundamentalist
group, Turkish Hezbollah, has been responsible for
hundreds of murders in recent decades. In
January 2001, the Turkish government raided the
organization, arresting scores of militants, and
killing the group’s leader, Huseyin
Velioglu. The raid, which led to the
discovery of the corpses of hundreds of Hezbollah
victims, dealt a significant setback to the
militant group.[36]
Perhaps the most vivid example of Islamic
fundamentalism within recent years is that of
Afghanistan. In 1978, the People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) seized
power in a military coup. Allying with the
Soviet Union, the PDPA began shaping Afghanistan
along Marxist lines. With Islam thus
threatened, the mujahideen, a loose
alliance of Afghan nationalists, rebelled and took
over many of the rural areas of the country.
In response, the Soviet Union invaded in 1979 in
an effort to shore up the PDPA, a move which swung
popular support to the mujahideen even as
millions of Afghans fled to neighboring Pakistan
and Iran. The Pakistan government supported
the refugee mujahideen with arms and
military training, as did many other countries
hostile to the Soviet Union, including the United
States. Many Islamic fundamentalist groups
were among the mujahideen factions,
including Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden.
When the Soviet Union finally withdrew from
Afghanistan in 1989, leaving the PDPA in power,
the mujahideen did not stop
fighting. In 1992 they captured the capital
of Kabul and overthrew the PDPA, only to lapse
into infighting among the various factions.
In 1996 the Taliban, having emerged as the
strongest faction, seized control of Kabul.
Although initially hailed by both the Afghan
populace and the United States, who had hopes for
a return of stability to the country, the Taliban,
allied with bin Laden, soon forced their concept
of Islamic fundamentalism upon Afghanistan.
The result was a period of severe oppression as
the Taliban, with their religious police, punished
citizens who engaged in un-Islamic activities such
as television, movies, music, kite-flying and
chess. Men were forced to wear beards of
proper length, and women were curtailed from
public life and were severely punished if not
properly clothed or accompanied by a male relative
when in public. Punishment of offenders in
the form of death was not uncommon.
The reign of the Taliban, however, proved
short-lived. On September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda
operatives hijacked four U.S. commercial planes,
crashing two of them into the Twin Towers of New
York City’s World Trade Center and one into the
U.S. Pentagon. The fourth crashed in rural
Pennsylvania as passengers struggled with the
hijackers. The attacks killed nearly 3000
people, and the United States quickly launched a
counter-attack, invading Afghanistan and
installing a new government on December 22, 2001.[37]
Lebanon is another Arab country with a strong
opposition fundamentalist presence. Since
the 1970s, both Sunni and Shiite fundamentalists
(such as the Islamic Unity Movement, the Islamic
Association, and Amal and Ummat Hizb Allah) have
been competing for political supremacy, fueled by
opposition to the West and to Israel, as well as
Lebanon’s religious establishment and government.[38]
Iran provides the sole example of the political
triumph of Shiite fundamentalism. The
Islamic revolution of 1979, led by the influential
Islamic theologian Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and
fueled to a significant degree by restless young
people, provided a model for how Islamic
fundamentalism could takeover government
structures. Khomeini’s widely disseminated
speeches against the Shah and advocating Islamic
law helped pave the way for the revolution.
The new regime immediately banned alcohol,
repressed women, and implemented the death penalty
for adultery, all the while voicing open hatred of
the West. By the end of the 1980s, however,
revolutionary fervor was waning as Iranian
businessman tired of isolation from the
West. Although Islamic law yet governs Iran,
the country has made various overtures to the
West, and the current president of Iran defeated
the conservative religious establishment in the
last election.[39]
Saudi Arabia provides an example of a country
governed by Islamic Law (sharia law).
Long influenced by scriptural fundamentalism of
the Wahabbi tradition, the Saudi government in
recent decades has nonetheless faced opposition
from many Muslims from both the right and left of
the political spectrum. In a country in
which women are openly repressed and crimes are
dealt with according to a strict interpretation of
the Quran, the Saudi ruling royal family has
nonetheless maintained ties with the Western world
for their own economic benefit and that of the
country. Accordingly, many militant
fundamentalists (both Shiite and Sunni), opposed
to all Western influences, have long agitated for
stricter application of Islamic law. The
ruling family has responded in recent years by
making some concessions to militant
fundamentalists, but the Gulf wars have served to
heighten the tension between the government and
militant fundamentalist factions.[40]
Sudan’s distinction lies in being the first
country to be governed by Muslim Brotherhood
Islamic fundamentalism. The Brotherhood
pursued a policy of gradualism in the 1970s, while
Sudan struggled with socialism. The
gradualist policy paid off in the next decade,
leading to a period of significant political
influence in the 1980s as Brotherhood leaders,
including Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, formerly imprisoned
by the government, were released and given cabinet
positions. In 1989 a coup d’etat led to
Turabi emerging as Sudan’s supreme ideologue and
de factor ruler. Shraria law was imposed on
the country, and Turabi began an ethnic cleansing
campaign against non-Muslims. A strict
Islamic state, Sudan’s government has been a haven
for Islamic terrorists.[41]
Many other countries have been dealing with a
growing Islamic political fundamentalist presence
since the 1970s.[42]
Two examples in the non-Arab world are Malaysia
and Indonesia. Since the 1980s, Malaysia has
become an increasingly Islamic nation as Muslims
have proliferated within a society which is open
to a variety of beliefs. Although Islam is
now recognized as the official state religion, the
state itself is secular, and the constitution
provides religious tolerance. Within this
political paradigm, the influence of
fundamentalist Muslims, initially finding
expression in student activists during political
and social crisis in the 1970s, is growing in
significance.[43]
Indonesia, on the other hand, has the largest
Muslim population of any country, yet is not an
Islamic nation. Islamic fundamentalists,
although increasing in influence somewhat, have
been hampered by a wide diversity of Islamic faith
traditions that are a result of long-standing
religious syncretism.[44]
The current conflicts in the Arab world are
magnifying the Islamic fundamentalist influence
throughout the world. As such, a closer
examination of Islamic fundamentalist responses to
modern science, western society and the secular
state is in order.
[32]
Voll, “Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab
World.” 368-374. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones
(Indianapolis: American Trust,
1990). Ahmad S. Moussali, Historical
Dictionary of Islamic Fundamentalist Movements
in the Arab World, Iran and Turkey (Lanham,
Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.), 240-242.
[35]
Ibid., 205-208. Hugh Roberts, “From
Radical Mission to Equivocal Ambition: The
Expansion and Manipulation of Algerian
Islamism, 1979-1992,” in Accounting for
Fundamentalisms, The Fundamentalism
Project, Volume 4, eds. Martin Marty and R.
Scott Appleby (Chicago and London: University
of Chicago Press, 1994), 428-489.
[36]
Anat Lapidot, “Islamic Activism in Turkey
Since the 1980 Military Takeover,” in Religious
Radicalism in the Greater Middle East,
eds. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar
(London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass,
1997), 62-74. Kushner, Encyclopedia
of Terrorism, 368-369.
[37]
Kushner, 20-24, 71-74, 246-247, 357-359.
[39]
Hito, 142-226. Nikki R. Keddie and
Farrah Monian, “Militancy and Religion in
Contemporary Iran,” in Fundamentalisms and
the State, The Fundamentalism Project,
Volume 3, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott
Appleby (Chicago and London: University of
Chicago Press, 1993), 511-538.
[40]
Ibid., 130-151. Hito, 108-141.
[42]
Maddy-Weitzman and Inbar, Religious
Radicalism. Pipes, In the
Path of God, 203-278.
[43]
Manning Nash, “Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia
and Indonesia,” in Fundamentalisms
Observed, The Fundamentalism Project,
Volume 1, eds. Martin Marty and R. Scott
Appleby (Chicago and London: University of
Chicago Press, 1991), 691-715, 724-734.
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